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EDITORIAL NOTE

Our knowledge of the relationship between employee
compensation and performance has developed through
years of research and practice. But how much of this
knowledge is founded on evidence, how much is just
common sense, and how much is folklore? In this
article, Kevin Chalk provides a viewpoint on the evidence
behind decisions to offer employees fixed or variable
compensation. The article approaches the topic as a
critically appraised topic (CAT), a framework that seeks to
punch through the noise around the subject, identify the
evidence, critically review it, and make a recommendation
to practice. Given the broad interest, such a task is made
feasible because several respected literature reviews
became available in the past decade or so. Chalk analyzes
these together with recent empirical works. As with
many CATs, Chalk aims to provide advice regarding a
specific practice; advice based on evidence in the research
literature. Is there evidence that variable compensation
works, yes or no? In this case (actually, like many cases)
the outcome confirms the practice in some situations, but
denies it in others. Variable compensation is not always
the best incentive. The answer is conditional: it depends.
The important question Chalk answers is, on what?
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ABSTRACT
This topic paper examines the question of whether a variable compensation structure helps motivate increased sales more than a fixed
compensation structure. The analysis is based on peer-reviewed
articles focused on compensation and incentive structures and performance measurement. Our findings suggest that variable compensation can increase sales performance—but only to a certain degree.
A proper compensation structure would be a combination of both variable and fixed components.
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RESEARCH QUESTION
Does a variable compensation structure
help motivate increased sales more than
a fixed compensation structure?

Table 1: PICOC Format
P = Problem or Population

Organizations that have a sales performance metric but less than optimal results

I = Intervention or Success Factor

Increased sales results by aligning compensation, organizational goals, and culture more closely with
employee goals

C = Comparison

Compare the sales performance using a variable compensation structure vs. a fixed compensation
structure

O = Outcome

Increased motivation among sales professionals to meet organizational sales performance metrics

C = Context

Organizations employing sales/business development professionals

BACKGROUND
Sales force turnover is an issue that most
organizations face at one point or another. Some firms consider themselves
fortunate if they retain 50% of new sales
people for two or three years. When adding together the costs associated with
onboarding a new hire and the costs associated with unrealized sales (because
of the transitions involved in staffing
changes), total costs for some firms
can range from $50,000 to $75,000 per
salesperson (Futrell and Parasuraman,
1984). One of the issues related to turnover stems from compensation (Darmon,
2008). Sales-oriented organizations often
face the complex decision of how to appropriately compensate their sales force.
Organizations must consider various factors when deciding the most effective
compensation and incentive structure,
including the organizational life cycle (i.e.,
start-up, growth, maturity, or decline) of
the organization (Madhani, 2010), the organizational culture (Madhani, 2014), and
the ever-evolving competitive landscape.
Deo (2011) stresses that, regardless of
the pay structure an organization chooses to adopt, that structure should attract
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the right talent and should not be so costly
that it creates a disadvantage for the organization compared to similar firms in
the respective industry.

sists of or includes a variable (incentive)
component helps to increase sales results
compared to a fixed (base) compensation
structure.

Madhani (2010) defines fixed pay (base
pay) as a noncontingent reward that is not
tied to the completion of a specific task.
It is simply pay for participation. Variable
pay1 (also called incentive pay in some of
the literature) is a performance-contingent reward, where the amount is variable and requires a specified quality of
performance. When base pay is coupled
with a bonus payout, this fixed compensation structure can be an attractive one
for some sales professionals because the
base pay structure provides a compensation “floor” when the sales funnel begins
to slow. However, a base pay structure
can be expensive for smaller, start-up organizations (Madhani, 2010), and in some
instances the base salary can create performance issues for sales professionals
that are not motivated by incentives tied
to sales results. This topic paper examines
the current literature to explore whether a
compensation structure that either con-

The terms variable pay, incentive pay and incentives are used interchangeably.
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SEARCH STRATEGY
A stepwise method was used to search
for relevant articles in three databases:
EBSCOhost, ABI/Inform, and Business
Source Complete. We chose these databases because they provide access to
many peer-reviewed business journals.
Initially, the research question was used
as the initial search query, which returned
the following results: EBSCOhost provided
35,400 results; Business Source Complete
provided 2 papers; and ABI/Inform provided no results. To expand the results from
the ABI/INFORM and Business Source
Complete databases (and to refine the
results from EBSCOhost), the following
set of terms was used as Boolean search
criteria:

font and Martimort (2001), Boyer (2011)
uses a behavioral model to derive some
general principals in setting up an incentive pay system. Deo (2011) formulates a
framework for a compensation structure
by performing an extensive review of related literature and then implementing
the compensation structure based on a
Fortune 500 company (Deo, 2011). Both
Dohmen and Falk (2011) and Friebel et
al. (2017) study the effect of incentives
by designing controlled laboratory experiments. Dohmen and Falk (2011) state that
experiments are ideal for studying how
individual characteristics affect decision
making, relative to incentives, because rel-

evant data is difficult to collect in the field.
In addition to conducting an extensive
literature review, Madhani (2010, 2014)
constructs several frameworks based on
the literature reviewed to support the incentive structure claims.

Figure 1: Search Strategy

•F
 ixed and variable compensation
structures OR fixed and variable
incentive structures AND
performance measurement.
When we implemented the refined search
criteria, EBSCOhost gave 10 results; ABI/
INFORM gave 267,745 results; and Business Source Complete gave 2 results. To
further refine the results from ABI/INFORM, we screened the findings using the
following criteria: 2010–present; English;
United States; wages and salaries; and
employment or employees. The additional screen for the ABI/INFORM database
provided results of 425. The third screen
of “peer reviewed” was added to each
database’s findings, and in these results,
EBSCOhost provided 6 titles; Business
Source Complete provided 2 titles; and
ABI/INFORM provided 368 titles. The titles of each data set were reviewed to
identify relevance; the review resulted in
four articles being chosen from ABI/INFORM and one article from both EBSCOhost and Business Source Complete. The
search strategy is displayed in Figure 1;
Table 2 provides the final search results.
Table 3 lists each of the articles by author,
research approach, empirical basis for the
research, analytical method, and overall validity. Based on the seminal works
of Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Laf-
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Table 2. Search Results
1

Boyer, M. (2011). The twelve principles of incentive pay. Revue d'économie politique, 121(3): 285–306.

2

Deo, P. S. (2011). Designing performance-based incentives. Part I: A framework. Corporate Finance Review, 16(1): 18.
Deo, P. S. (2011). Designing performance-based incentives. Part II: Implementation. Corporate Finance Review, 16(2): 10.

3

Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011). Performance pay and multidimensional sorting: Productivity, preferences, and gender. American
Economic Review, 101(2): 556–90.

4

Friebel, G., Heinz, M., Krueger, M., & Zubanov, N. (2017). Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain. American
Economic Review, 107(8): 2168–2203.

5

Madhani, P. M. (2014). Aligning compensation systems with organization culture. Compensation & Benefits Review, 46(2): 103–15.

6

Madhani, P. M. (2010). Realigning fixed and variable pay in sales organizations: An organizational life cycle approach. Compensation &
Benefits Review, 42(6): 488–98.

Table 3. Evaluation of Overall Validity
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Study #

Research Approach

Empirical Basis

Analysis Method

Overall Validity

1-Boyer, M.
(2011)

Formal modeling

List of 12 incentive pay
principals

Inductive reasoning based on
behavior and economic models

Conclusions drawn based on
application of 2 models

2-Deo, P. (2011)

Literature review
(Part 1), Case study/
literature review
(Part 2)

47 referenced works
consisting of journals,
articles, interviews, and
URLs (Part 1); Fortune 500
company (represented by a
fictitious name) used as a
case study (Part 2)

Analysis of literature to
design an incentive structure
framework (Part 1); analysis of
literature to propose an annual
performance-based incentive
design based on a case study
(Part 2)

Conclusion and
recommendations drawn
through literature review

3-Dohmen and
Falk (2011)

Experiment

12-step work task
experiment involving 360
participants asked to selfselect into variable-pay or
fixed-pay schemes

Statistical inference

Statistically significant
findings; limitation:
participants were students

4-Friebel et al.
(2017)

Experiment

Retail chain involving 1300
sales employees across 193
stores

Statistical inference

Conclusions drawn from data

5-Madhani, P.
(2014)

Literature review

25 referenced works, to
include peer reviewed
journals, articles, and
published books

Theoretical inference

Conclusion and
recommendations drawn
through literature review

6-Madhani, P.
(2010)

Qualitative theoretical
paper

63 referenced works, to
included peer reviewed
journals, articles, and
published books

Theoretical inference

Conclusion and
recommendations drawn
through literature review
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FINDINGS
Table 4 summarizes the key findings from
each paper with a summary translation of
the collective findings. There are four main
themes that emerge from a review of the
articles: time, organizational objective and
culture, productivity, and risk-taking.
Important elements to consider in relation to compensation are the nature of the
performance measurement (short-term or
long-term) and the timing of the incentive
pay. Madhani (2014) states that when organizations create a structured and more
formalized workplace environment, they
typically have a longer-term focus and
therefore put a greater focus on fixed pay
structures. Madhani (2010) explains that
a larger focus on variable pay can cause
salespeople to become short-sighted
(more individually focused) in terms of
how they spend their time. Deo (2011)
elaborates further, stating that incentives
should place an emphasis on both longterm and short-term performance, with
longer term performance focused on overall company goals and shorter-term performance focused on individual goals. Deo
(2011) also points out that the method of
payment for short-term incentives should
be in the form of cash, while longer term
incentives could be in the form of company
stock. The timing of the payment is a key
element to consider as well. Boyer (2011)
explains that the effect of an individual’s
performance must be considered when
implementing an incentive pay system.
For example, individual contributors who
achieve short-term goals should receive
their incentive compensation when the
goals are met. In summary, time is a key
element—whether relating to long-term
and short-term organizational objectives or to when incentive payments are
made—to consider in the evaluation of
incentive pay structure. Variable compensation should be focused on shorter term
individual goals, while fixed compensation
is better suited for longer term organizational goals.
Organizations have unique goals and objectives that are created to help guide the
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activities of employees. Also unique to the
organization is its culture. Both the organizational goals and objectives and the
organizational culture are key themes that
emerge in the selected articles. Deo (2011)
states an effective compensation strategy
design should include both fixed and variable components to inspire employees to
achieve firm objectives. Similarly, Madhani
(2010) states that a combination of fixed
and variable pay attracts the best talent
and provides sufficient motivation. Friebel
et. al (2017) point out that organizations
can motivate underperforming teams by
implementing a properly structured incentive plan. Dohmen and Falk (2011) point
out that changing the compensation system potentially can change the firm culture. In addition, when the proper balance
between firm culture and compensation
strategy is achieved, the synergy becomes
a competitive advantage (Madhani, 2014).
The common element across each paper,
relating to organizational goals and objectives and culture, is the conclusion that a
combination of both variable and fixed pay
offers the best opportunity to achieve the
desired performance results and to create
the best firm culture.
Productivity is the third theme that
emerges across several of the papers reviewed. Madhani (2014) describes the differences in organizational culture where
the emphasis is on more variable compensation vs. fixed compensation; in addition,
the individuals who succeed in these types
of organizations are different. In terms of
productivity, organizations that focus on
high-volume, ongoing business development might attract more productive workers compared to organizations that seek
to develop deep customer relationships.
In other words, when faced with an alternative between variable compensation
and fixed compensation, more productive
workers prefer variable pay (Dohmen and
Falk, 2011). Friebel et. al (2017) state that
when teams of employees receive both
variable and fixed pay, the extra productivity of the workers receiving variable pay
does not have an overall effect on team
output. Therefore, organizations might
consider this data when hiring workers or

designing compensation plans. Deo (2011)
offers this guidance: Workers whose productivity is above organization goals could
be entitled to both variable and fixed compensation, while those who underperform
targets receive only a fixed compensation. To summarize, although variable
pay structures do not necessarily lead to
increased productivity, more productive
employees select variable compensation
over base pay alone.
The final theme that emerges from the review involves workers’ view of risk-taking
relative to compensation plans. Dohmen
and Falk (2011) point out that different
incentive plans attract workers that have
varying attitudes toward risk-taking. Friebel et. al (2017) observe that, in terms of
effort, the marginal cost of effort is larger
for older workers, and among teams that
have older workers, the incentives lead to
smaller effects on sales. The implication is
that older workers might not be willing to
take on additional risk to earn higher pay.
Madhani (2010) suggests that less wellknown firms and firms in the start-up
phase of the business cycle should have
a compensation structure in which variable pay is a larger proportion of overall
pay. This compensation structure attracts
more risk-tolerant individuals and rewards
them for taking the financial risks associated with working for a less established
firm. Boyer (2011) points out a potential
risk of implementing a variable-pay incentive plan. Because it compensates people
for bearing risk, these incentive plans ultimately can be very costly to organizations.
In summary, the articles reviewed clearly
indicate that individuals view risk-taking differently. Some individuals are less
risk averse and might be willing to work
for a start-up firm, while individuals that
are approaching retirement might be less
willing to take on the financial risks associated with less established firms that rely
more on variable compensation plans. Organizations can use compensation structures to attract employees who can best
help them to achieve their overall business
objectives.
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Table 4. Key findings and our translation of the collective findings

Study 1
Boyer, M. (2011)

Study 2
(Parts 1 and 2)
Deo, P. (2011)

Study 3
Dohmen and Falk
(2011)

Finding 1
(Time)

Finding 2
(Organizational Objective/
Culture)

Incentive payments must be
made when the information
on performance is obtained.

Incentive pay can help to
ensure that the pursuit
of individual objectives
focuses on achieving the
organization’s goals and
objectives.

Incentives should emphasize
both long-term performance
(based on overall
organizational goals), paid in
the form of company shares,
and short- term performance
(based on individual business
units), paid in the form of
cash.

The incentive plan should
include both fixed and
variable components
to motivate employee
performance and to achieve
planned objectives.

Fixed compensation can be
used to pay employees who
don’t meet targets, while
employees who exceed them
can receive both fixed and
variable pay.

Variable plans can be used
to motivate employees to
exceed targets; the firm pays
elevated payouts for higher
levels of performance; and
the variable payout may
increase at a higher rate after
targets are met.

Salespeople in fixed payment
systems need more time to
solve problems.

Changing the pay system
can change the entire work
environment and firm
culture.

When choosing between
the alternatives of variable
and fixed payments,
more productive workers
systematically prefer the
variable pay.

Different incentive schemes
systematically attract
individuals who have
different attitudes, such as
a willingness to take risks
and a relatively higher selfassessment.

Historically underperforming
teams can be successfully
motivated to perform better
with the implementation of
an incentive plan; however,
high-performing teams
would not be motivated to
perform better.

In teams that are made up
of both variable and fixed
compensation workers,
the extra effort of variable
compensation workers has
no effect on the overall team
output.

Older workers may have
larger marginal costs of
effort, which translates
into a prediction that when
teams include older workers,
the bonus leads to smaller
effects on sales.

Organizations characterized
by a formalized, centralized,
and structured workplace
require a long-term,
system-wide perspective;
the heightened focus on
coordination would require a
larger focus on fixed pay.

When culture and pay mix
are synchronized, the result
is a synergy with which the
culture acts as an asset and a
competitive advantage.

Cultural differences exist
between organizations
where the emphasis is on
variable pay and those where
the emphasis is on base pay,
and the people that succeed
in the two cultures are
different.

If the business objective
is risk-taking, then the
compensation strategy
should have a higher
proportion of variable pay
opportunities.

Relatively low fixed pay and
too much variable pay, with
an opportunity for earning
large incentives, can cause
salespeople to become
short-sighted when it comes
to employing their time and
efforts.

Effective compensation
strategies focus on providing
a pay mix of enough fixed
pay to attract the best sales
employees and sufficient
variable pay to motivate
them.

Variable pay should be
focused on achieving shorter
term individual goals, while
fixed pay is better suited for
longer term organizational
goals.

A combination of both
variable pay and fixed pay
offers the best opportunity
to achieve desired
performance results and to
create the best firm culture.

Study 4
Friebel et al.,
(2017)

Study 5

Madhani, P.
(2014)

Study 6

Madhani, P.
(2010)

Translation
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Finding 3
(Productivity)

Finding 4
(Risk-Taking)
Incentive plans are costly to
run because of the need to
compensate people to bear
the risk.

Variable pay should increase
as a percentage of total
compensation when the firm
is relatively less well known
(e.g., at the start-up stage)
among its customers.

Variable pay does not
necessarily lead to increase
productivity; however, more
productive workers do select
incentivized compensation
over base pay alone.

Firm compensation structure
can be used to attract
specific characteristics in
salespeople. Those who are
motivated by an incentive
structure are less risk averse.

JANUARY 2022, VOL. 5, NO. 1

CONCLUSION
Based on our review and interpretation
of the articles’ conclusions (noted in Table 4), variable pay structures offer some
merit related to performance results in a
sales-oriented organization. Organizations’ compensation structure can be used
to attract employees who have specific
characteristics. Newly formed companies and less well-known companies in a
particular market can use a more heavily
focused variable compensation plan to attract salespeople who are less risk averse
and who tend to be more productive. The
variable portion of the compensation plan
should be focused on the shorter-term
goals at the individual level, while longer
term organization goals are better suited
for the fixed portion of the plan. Ideally, a
combination of both variable and fixed pay
offers the best opportunity to achieve the
desired performance and culture that organizations want to achieve.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the literature studied, organizations should consider factors at both the
firm level and the employee level when
designing or changing a compensation
structure. Firm level considerations would
include both the firm’s stage in its life cycle and its culture. Considerations for employees would include demographic and
personality characteristics, such as their
willingness to take risks, age, career stage,
and job function.
The research by Madhani (2010) offers
insights into structuring compensation
plans based on the life cycle of the organization. Specifically, start-up firms and
firms in the decline stages should lean
more heavily on variable compensation
structures because the uncertainty is
greater in these organizations. Madhani
further indicates that firms in the growth
and maturity stages typically are defined
by higher cash flows and can afford to lean
more on base pay structures. In terms of
firm culture, Madhani (2014) points out
that firms needing to adapt to changing
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market environments or wanting to heavily incentivize individual initiative would
focus on variable pay structures. Firms in
more predictable environments or needing
to emphasize organizational goals over individual goals would focus on a fixed pay
structure. Note that any changes in compensation structure can affect firm culture. As previously mentioned, Dohmen
and Falk (2011) state that introducing
variable pay in jobs that predominantly
have had fixed pay structures could reduce
job satisfaction among workers who are
accustomed to the consistencies of the
fixed pay structure.
Fixed and variable pay structures are likely to attract different types of workers. As
previously discussed, start-up firms face
greater risk than mature firms and are
likely to attract more risk-tolerant employees. Research conducted by Dohmen
and Falk (2011) found that workers who
are more productive and more willing to
take on risk also are more likely to prefer
a variable compensation structure. The
experiment conducted by Friebel et. al
(2017) shows that bonus structures have
a lesser effect on older workers. Therefore, highly productive risk-takers benefit
from a variable compensation structure,
and older workers tend to be less motivated by variable incentive plans. Firms also
should consider the roles employees play.
For example, in some cases, incentivizing
risk-taking and paying employees to take
on more risk has been shown to have negative consequences (Bloom and Milkovich,
1998).
Compensation decisions are complex and,
as discussed, affect both firms and their
employees. Ideally, organizations should
use a compensation plan that includes
both variable and fixed incentives. Variable
incentives would focus on short-term individual objectives paid when objectives
are met; fixed incentives are the base
compensation and longer-term incentive
packages.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH
Limitations of this study include the relatively small number of peer-reviewed
papers we found that related to compensation structures. Although we used
a broad, multi-step search strategy, as
shown in Figure 1, to identify pertinent papers, the limited research presents challenges when trying to draw conclusions
for practice. This paper offers a summary of key findings across the papers reviewed, it also reveals that opportunities
are abundant for future research on compensation structures and for expanding
the literature in this area.
Previous research has focused on organizational culture (Madhani, 2014), organizational life cycles (Madhani, 2010),
principles of incentive pay (Boyer, 2011),
and the design of compensation structures (Deo, 2011). To expand on the work
of Madhani (2010), researchers might
investigate the compensation structures of companies moving across the
various stages of the organizational life
cycle. For example, research could try to
link compensation structures to organizations’ length of time in a particular life
cycle stage. Dohmen and Falk (2011) and
Friebel et. al (2017) identify characteristics of individuals who might find fixed and
variable incentive structures attractive.
Many companies today use personality
testing instruments (e.g., Myers-Briggs,
DISC, and The Caliper Profile) prior to hiring sales professionals and other employees. Further research might link scores on
common personality testing to success in
variable or fixed compensation structures.
In addition, for many companies, the shift
to work from home during the pandemic has raised questions about whether
compensation should shift for workers
who would rather not return to the office.
Research could seek to understand the
effects of post-pandemic telecommuting work on organizations’ compensation
structures for pure remote workers, pure
on-site workers, and workers using a hybrid approach.
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